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ABSTRACT 
Social media are now widely used by affected members of the public during an emergency. As these platforms 
have become mainstream, governments have responded to the public’s expectation that information is available 
online, particularly during disasters. Emergency management organizations (EMOs) now widely use social 
media to communicate with the public alongside occasional intelligence gathering.  
While EMOs increasingly use social media, breakdowns in internal communication can inhibit the 
dissemination of timely information to their online followers. Drawing on a two-year ethnography at the 
Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES), an Australian EMO, this paper outlines how the organization 
uses social media to disseminate information during emergencies and identifies the internal tensions around its 
use. These tensions include the prioritization of operational duties over public information responsibilities, and 
the difficulties around requesting and receiving information from operational personnel located on the ground.  
Keywords 
Emergency management, social media, internal communication, disasters, ethnography 
INTRODUCTION 
Natural disasters cause significant human casualties and damage to both natural and built environments. Ill-
prepared communities are often most significantly affected, particularly as disasters often occur with little or no 
warning. In recent years, information and communication technologies have played an increasingly vital role in 
emergency management organizations’ (EMOs) response efforts to assist in disaster warning, preparation and 
relief work. As social media platforms have become mainstream in the last 6-7 years, they have opened up new 
possibilities for EMOs to communicate with the public and to gather on-the-ground information. The integration 
of social media is having wider effects on the dissemination of public information, as they challenge and 
reshape the roles and functions of EMOs and their communicative relationships with the public. 
Social media platforms are a relatively new medium for communicating with the public. When used effectively, 
these platforms can provide a dynamic means of communicating that is internally and externally distinct from 
the “static, one-way process” (Pechta et al., 2010, p. 1) that emergency management communication has 
traditionally been perceived as. However, research has demonstrated that EMOs use social media primarily as a 
platform to disseminate information by default, which is an extension of their traditional communication 
strategies. What these organizations post on social media replicates or supplements existing strategies (Mergel, 
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2013) as they push out information rather than facilitate a two-way conversation with followers (Ehnis and 
Bunker, 2012). During emergencies, EMOs use social media platforms including Facebook and Twitter to 
disseminate warnings to their followers, as well as safety tips and information about resources. Social media are 
also useful for providing ongoing updates to followers as an incident is unfolding, to reassure them that the 
organization is managing it or that it is under control. While intelligence-gathering tools exist, investing time 
and resources to best utilize them is not a priority of EMOs, given budget and resource constraints alongside the 
prioritization of quantifiable ‘on-the-ground’ resources. Further complicating this issue is that the value of 
investment in new technologies is difficult to measure. 
Based on a two-year period of participant observation in the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES), 
the state government department responsible for fire and emergency services in Queensland, Australia, this 
paper outlines how the organization uses social media to disseminate information during emergencies. It 
identifies that tensions may arise between ‘on-the-ground’ operational personnel and those personnel 
responsible for external public communication. Practical barriers can also prevent operational personnel who are 
responding to an incident from communicating updates internally. This directly affects members of the public 
who use social media with the expectation that they will access timely and current information from these 
organizations. The remainder of this paper explores the uses of social media for information dissemination in 
EMOs during emergencies, identifying and discussing the tensions shaping these uses. It particularly highlights 
how these organizations negotiate their social media engagements in the context of competing priorities and 
operational responsibilities.  
The research questions are: 
1. What are the tensions in EMOs that shape the uses of social media for information dissemination? 
2. Where do social media and public information responsibilities sit as a priority (alongside operational 
duties) within such organizations?  
BACKGROUND 
Social Media and Crisis Communication  
Recent academic and media attention on social media use in natural disasters and other crises has primarily 
focused on community contributions to an emergency response and the way community members communicate 
with one another during a disaster, primarily using platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. Researchers have 
covered a wide range of emergency events, including the Virginia Tech shootings (Palen et al., 2009; Vieweg et 
al., 2008), Haiti earthquake (Starbird and Palen, 2011; Yates and Paquette, 2011), 2010 Chilean earthquake 
(Starbird et al., 2011), 2011 Queensland floods (Bruns et al., 2012), 2011 Christchurch earthquakes (Bruns and 
Burgess, 2012), and Hurricane Sandy (Lachlan et al., 2014). A significant body of research has analyzed social 
media use from the perspective of the community (Palen et al., 2009; Vieweg et al., 2008), though this has 
tended to neglect the perspective of emergency management organizations (Latonero and Shklovski, 2011). 
There is a tendency for research to focus on the potential use of new technologies in emergency management 
and law enforcement agencies, rather than on how these technologies actually function and are utilized (see 
Mergel, 2013; Sanders, 2014; Sheptycki, 2004), a gap which researchers including Latonero and Shklovski 
(2011) have noted and begun to address. There is a need for further empirical research in this field, and for 
better knowledge sharing between practitioners and researchers, especially also drawing on embedded 
researchers who may examine these organizations first-hand (Plotnick et al., 2015). This paper reports on the 
findings of one such embedded research project. 
Social Media Use in Emergency Management Organizations  
While there has been reluctance within some EMOS to embrace new communication technologies, their 
adoption and use of social media has proven effective (Haddow et al., 2014, p. 369). EMO social media use has 
become commonplace as governments meet an increased public expectation that accurate and timely 
information is made available online, particularly during disasters (St. Denis, Hughes, and Palen, 2012). Despite 
this, disparities exist between the levels of activity on social media platforms by various organizations. EMOs 
can employ social media passively by using online platforms to monitor activity relevant to the organization, for 
example searching @mentions on Twitter to ‘listen’ to what people are saying about their organization. More 
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actively, EMOs can employ social media to respond to the public and strengthen the organization’s image 
within the community. Similarly, at an engaged level, established social network sites can build a deeper 
relationship with the community by listening and responding to community and public opinion and making the 
organization more transparent (Rive et al., 2012, p. 6). These different modes of activity lead to inconsistencies 
across different EMOs in the approaches to and purposes of social media use.  
The two key uses of social media—for intelligence-gathering and for information dissemination—relate to 
different parts of the organization. The use of social media for intelligence gathering is related to the 
organization’s operational disaster response concerns (see Yin et al., 2012, p. 52-53). In this instance social 
media are used to acquire the community’s knowledge of what is occurring around them, enabling decision-
makers to more accurately distribute resources to those in need and plan future operations more effectively (see 
Crowe, 2012, p. 216). As local community members are typically the first on the scene of a disaster, it is 
important to involve them in disaster response efforts (see Belblidia, 2010; Palen et al., 2007; Pechta et al., 
2010). A community equipped with smartphones is a valuable source of information for EMOs (Liu et al., 2009, 
p. 61; Palen et al., 2009, p. 478). 
In contrast, the use of social media for information dissemination is linked to the organization’s communication 
priorities during disasters, and to public relations priorities during ‘business as usual’ events (see Heverin and 
Zach, 2011, p. 28). In this scenario, social media are used as channels to regularly update the public with 
situational information including warnings, official instructions, road closures, and the location of vital 
resources. During ‘business as usual’ events EMOs can use social media to foster a relationship with the 
community in order to establish themselves as a source of information during disasters, promote the work of 
their organization, and disseminate key messages and safety information to build community resilience. When 
risk is clearly and effectively communicated to the community, they are more likely to appropriately prepare for 
an impending event, which ultimately influences their resilience in the situation (Mileti, 1999). Social media 
platforms can therefore nurture “strong community networks”, as their information-sharing capabilities can “be 
leveraged more effectively to provide communities with robust communication networks, thereby creating more 
resilient communities in areas at high risk of natural disasters” (Belblidia, 2010, p. 24). 
Social Media Use in Emergency Management: Barriers and Limitations 
Despite a growing body of research on the potential use of social media to gather intelligence during a disaster 
(Yin et al., 2012), EMOs’ actual use of social media for this purpose currently remains significantly 
underdeveloped. Significant barriers exist preventing these organizations from investing in social media. While 
technological barriers offer a challenge, it is not the primary one. In their examination of United States 
emergency managers’ uses of social media, Hiltz et al. (2014) found “the major barriers to use of social 
media…are organizational even more than technical” (p. 605). In her broader examination of social media 
adoption in the Canadian public sector, McNutt (2014) corroborates these findings. It seems clear that the 
organizational barriers preventing social media adoption and use are inherently government-related and are not 
specific to EMOs. Resource limitations—such as budget restrictions and a lack of sufficiently skilled staff—
present one such barrier (Hughes and Palen, 2012; Plotnick et al., 2015). For example, in their survey of county-
level emergency managers in the United States, Plotnick et al. (2015) note that budget constraints in smaller 
organizations are likely preventing them from investing in the tools and staff to manage social media. However, 
even when larger or better-funded organizations do use social media, the cost of sophisticated intelligence-
gathering tools may prove inhibitive, preventing the organization from advancing its social media efforts beyond 
their default one-way communication approach.  
Plotnick et al. (2015) refer to the “information overload” issues that emerge when these organizations employ 
social media for two-way communication, but note that a combination of manual and automated approaches can 
overcome these issues. Even when suitable tools are available, a lack of staff to mine and interpret the data 
provides a barrier preventing the effective use of social media for intelligence gathering. The suitability of 
existing intelligence-gathering tools to monitor the platforms used by the community may also provide an 
obstacle, as intelligence-gathering tools are typically designed for Twitter. This platform is not as popular in 
Queensland, the site of this research, making such intelligence gathering largely redundant for an organization 
like QFES as Facebook is the most popular social media platform in Australia more generally (Sensis, 2015). 
Further, in their mapping of the Australian Twittersphere, Bruns et al. (2014) found that Australian Twitter users 
are clustered around metropolitan hubs (as is the Australian population overall). This is problematic in 
Queensland as most severe weather events occur in remote areas. With this in mind, resistance towards 
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intelligence-gathering tools for an organization like QFES is understandable. Furthermore, Facebook’s various 
privacy settings make it difficult to gather useful on-the-ground information from an organization’s followers 
using that platform. Intelligence-gathering tools that primarily mine data from Twitter render such tools 
ineffective in this instance. Such underutilization of Twitter makes experimentation with expensive monitoring 
platforms (often tens of thousands of dollars annually) unjustifiable, particularly for a product whose suitability 
is uncertain and must inevitably compete with more immediate resource demands. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This paper focuses on the organizational tensions that exist between operational and communications personnel 
around public information dissemination during an incident. It is based on a two-year period of participant 
observation in the Queensland Fire and Emergency Services (QFES). QFES is the state government department 
responsible for fire and emergency services in Queensland – one of the largest, most populated and 
geographically diverse states in Australia. Over two years of participant observation I typically spent two days 
per week at the organization, however this increased during significant weather events or periods of increased 
activity. The data gathered through these observations included field notes, copies of numerous government 
policies, internal reviews and reports (obtained with permissions granted by QFES and with their full 
knowledge, when they were not publicly available), as well as publicly-available legislation and media releases. 
I positioned myself within the Media and Corporate Communications (MACC) division from which the 
organization conducts its public information function. When my observations began, I embedded myself within 
a distinct and separate MACC social media team of four members. Following a large-scale organizational 
review (Queensland Government, 2013) and subsequent restructure, this distinct social media team disbanded 
and was reabsorbed within the existing media team where I continued my observations. This led to the media 
team acquiring additional and largely unfamiliar work during a time when resources were already strained. 
To support my observations I also conducted 25 in-depth, semi-structured interviews across the course of my 
fieldwork with key organizational personnel using social media in their role. Interviews averaged 45 minutes in 
length. In keeping with the semi-structured nature of the interviews, although I had questions prepared I used the 
interviews as an opportunity to further draw out scenes I had observed, or to provide the participants with an 
opportunity to discuss in greater depth comments they made during my observations. I also allowed follow-up 
questions to emerge in response to interviewees’ answers. I transcribed these interviews verbatim shortly after 
the conclusion of the interview, adding additional contextual information about the scene and the participant to 
the beginning of the transcription.  
To analyze the data I borrowed from the Grounded Theory approaches outlined by Charmaz (2014), in closely 
reviewing my field notes and interview transcripts and identifying key themes as they emerged. During 
observations, I noted that tensions between different divisions within the organization could surface during an 
unfolding event, as these divisions attempt to balance differing responsibilities and priorities. I explored these 
differing priorities with members of the MACC team through informal conversations during the later stages of 
my observations and during in-depth interviews. This paper specifically seeks to explore these tensions, and to 
understand how and why they exist. Being situated in QFES and observing these tensions during major disasters 
(category five cyclones) and smaller incidents (such as commercial building fires), I observed first-hand the 
conflicting views around where public information sits as a priority between the different organizational 
divisions. I present and discuss the findings of those observations and interviews in the subsequent sections of 
this paper. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Prioritizing Operational Duties over Public Information Responsibilities  
This study found that frequently, QFES media and communications personnel would have trouble contacting 
operational personnel located on the ground and receiving information from them during an incident. There are 
two reasons for this. Firstly, on-the-ground personnel attending an incident were busy with operational 
responsibilities. Secondly, as outlined below, on-the-ground personnel were sometimes hesitant to provide 
updates from the scene. Consequently, updates were usually infrequent and dependent on the media officer’s or 
manager’s ability to reach their one contact person on the scene. 
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Understandably, during an unfolding incident operational personnel are engaged in their work and in the 
immediate tasks at hand. While they may be the appointed on-the-ground contact person for MACC, their 
ongoing operational responsibilities mean they do not always have time to immediately respond to requests for 
information or media interviews. As one media officer within the organization explained: 
“Sometimes, you don’t know because they are so operationally busy, you can’t track them down. It’s 
the nature of the beast…“oh yeah I’ve got to do an interview right now or I have got to go into this 
water and save somebody who is trapped and clinging to a tree”. We’re gonna get second, it’s always 
operational first.” 
This prioritization of operational duties over MACC’s public information responsibilities is understandable. 
When members of the public are at risk, operational personnel will necessarily prioritize public safety over other 
responsibilities that are not ostensibly about life or death. However, this approach makes the job of the media 
and communications personnel responsible for keeping the public informed – whose actions may well prevent 
other members of the public from putting themselves in danger – much more difficult. These different roles 
functioning simultaneously within QFES—whose responsibilities are essentially at odds with one another—
create internal tensions. The communications personnel wish to share information with the public in a timely 
manner, while the operational personnel need to conduct the on-the-ground incident response. However, as the 
communications team is dependent on those operational personnel for information to disseminate, their work is 
impeded for reasons outside of their control. 
Although on-the-ground personnel may be confronted by community members in danger, certain contexts may 
call for a more pragmatic approach where they must do the greatest good for the greatest number of people. For 
EMOs, communicating to the public is not always obviously a second-order activity. If the officer on the ground 
had a choice between assisting one at-risk individual before them and providing an update to MACC that leads 
to an entire town evacuating, the later action clearly saves more lives. The problem is that the officer on the 
ground does not see the second scenario as clearly as the individual in trouble before them. EMOs must 
therefore challenge the mindset of on-the-ground personnel, so they recognize that communication is also an 
important part of their operational responsibilities.  
Further, as another participant conceded, the organization does not have an existing culture of information 
sharing for the purposes of public dissemination. The following perspective reinforces how operational 
responsibilities take precedence over other responsibilities. It also suggests that the timeliness demanded of 
social media communication is problematic given the existing communicative structures within these 
organizations:  
“…Traditionally there’s never been a line of communication from a fire in that blow-by-blow sort of 
way. …The people who have it [the information] are busy fighting a fire and they don't have a culture 
of reporting it and that’s for good reason. It’s because things change quickly and no matter how 
quickly you ring somebody you can get some information and you can post it and by the time it hits 
people’s timelines it’s half an hour later at the very earliest and you’ve just given them information 
that might actually be wrong.” 
The volatile nature of disasters (in this case fires) means that the spread of misinformation is a genuine risk for 
these organizations when using social media. Naturally, this is problematic for EMOs when this misinformation 
could potentially cost lives. The fear of being responsible for spreading outdated information perhaps indicates 
why there are internal tensions around information sharing between on the ground personnel and MACC 
personnel.  
Even when the organization does post information in a timely manner, they ultimately have no control over 
when followers will receive that information, as another participant acknowledged: 
“We can’t validate when they received the information. Do they look at it immediately? Or do they 
look at it in two hours?” 
Consequently, the spread of misinformation during an incident may be outside of the control of the organization, 
because their followers may only check their social media timelines and receive that notification some time after 
the organization posted it. However, this does not necessarily mean that EMOs can abrogate their responsibility 
to provide information in a timely manner in the first place. 
Requesting and Receiving Information from Officials on the Ground  
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While operational duties typically took precedence over public information responsibilities, MACC personnel 
also experienced difficulty receiving information and updates once they had made contact with personnel on the 
ground. This study found that often on-the-ground personnel were reluctant to provide any update until they had 
confirmation that the information was correct. For example, in the case of a fire incident, this confirmation may 
only come from operational personnel when they are certain they have completely extinguished the fire. One 
media officer recalled an incident where this inhibited their work, as they could not provide information to the 
media or the public via social media: 
“We rang them every five minutes for half an hour, so that’s six phone calls. “Is the fire out?” “We 
believe the fire is out we can’t confirm yet.” “We believe the fire is out but we can’t confirm yet.” “Do 
not release that the fire is out because we cannot confirm yet”. That’s a thing that’s always gone 
through their operational capabilities, that you must confirm that the fire is out 100% and it’s been 
verified before you release that information…” 
This situation was worsened by the fact that the fire was occurring in the center of a city and media were on the 
ground observing the incident and reporting live. The media team did eventually post a tweet, but only to 
confirm that the fire was out once they had received confirmation from operational personnel on the ground. 
According to one media officer this occurred twenty-five minutes after on-the-ground media had reported the 
fire was almost out as they witnessed it themselves. This incident not only demonstrates the difficulty in 
receiving information from operational personnel, but also the difficulty in disseminating public information as 
an incident unfolds. Unfortunately, this is at odds with the public’s expectation of these organizations’ social 
media presences. As one media team member explained: 
“…The community expects us to provide information to them, during incidents in particular, because 
we are the emergency services. [They] should be able to see an incident of almost any hazard and 
naturally think, “The emergency services will be involved” and therefore they should be able to come 
to our page, no matter what the hazard or what the response is, or who the lead agency is.” 
As this interviewee explained, when the organization maintains a presence on social media their followers 
rightly expect that they will receive timely information about incidents as they are unfolding. However, 
providing timely information to the public is also about fulfilling what many within the media team perceive as 
their role during an incident: 
“…We want people to come to us as a point of authority, it looks silly at a fire if [other agencies] are 
tweeting but the people who are the lead agency on the fire are not.” 
As this participant articulates, not only must the organization provide information to the public to meet their 
expectations, but it is also important to ensure that the public perceives them as a primary source of authoritative 
information. As the organization responsible for public safety during times of crisis, it is paramount that the 
public trusts them, views them as the authority, and turns to them in the first place for information and warnings. 
Consequently, breakdowns in internal communication flows can prevent the public and the media from viewing 
the organization in this way.  
While responders’ concerns around the timeliness and validity of information in changeable situations are 
understandable, there are risks associated with their failure to provide information. In some cases, this may 
create more harm. The proliferation of social media platforms, however, has meant that members of the public 
now disseminate and search for updates and information through their online networks, no longer utilizing 
official organizations as their sole source of information (Hughes and Palen, 2012, p. 1). The risk of 
misinformation around an incident potentially increases as the mainstream media and social media users look to 
others located on the scene of an incident as a source of information. Furthermore, in uncertain and dangerous 
conditions, at-risk members of the community – who may not even turn to other sources for information but 
instead rely only on authorities – may instead make ill-informed decisions when they do not have regular 
updates and information. Consequently, in the current crisis communication climate EMOs must find a balance 
between meeting the public’s expectations to deliver valid information in a timely manner, and satisfying their 
internal information dissemination approval processes.  
Maintaining a Consistent Level of Communication  
Some participants also raised concerns about their ability to maintain a consistent standard when disseminating 
information via social media during an unfolding incident. Currently, media officers are rostered to different 
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shifts within a window from 6.30am until 5.30pm from Monday to Friday. Outside of these hours, the team 
operates on an on-call roster, with one media officer and one manager rostered at any given time overnight and 
during weekends. Outside of office hours an ‘out of office’ auto-reply is switched on to the team’s email, 
instructing media to call the on-call phone number for any inquiries. The on-call media officer does not check 
social media overnight, however they do check social media at set times thrice daily during the weekend.  
When a smaller incident such as a building fire unfolds during office hours, the team has the resources to 
provide ongoing updates to the public and mainstream media. Their workload may increase, they may 
experience an increase in calls from media, and they may have a greater (yet largely manageable) amount of 
traffic on their social media pages. Despite this, by having an adequate number of team members rostered during 
the day, and managers whom they can call on for additional support, the team can manage such incidents.  
In contrast, during overnight and weekend incidents the on-call media officer works in isolation, except for the 
support of their on-call manager. During weekends in particular, when an incident may receive the same degree 
of public and media attention as on a weekday, the responsibility for single-handedly responding to media 
enquiries, issuing warnings, and monitoring social media can become unmanageable. During an event, managers 
call in “off-duty” communications personnel or roster them in advance when they anticipate a protracted event. 
Even then, their workload, with the addition of social media responsibilities, is occasionally unmanageable. In 
some cases, regular social media monitoring—checking and responding to comments, providing updates as the 
incident is unfolding—is neglected. There is a conscious effort to ensure that team members work fixed shifts 
(albeit longer than usual given the circumstances) to avoid the onset of fatigue. With this in mind, there is the 
potential to train and pull in communications personnel from other government departments, assuming that they 
are not busy with their own work. Latonero and Shklovski’s (2011) case study of the Los Angeles Fire 
Department (LAFD) demonstrates that such concerns are not limited to QFES, but are an issue with which many 
EMOs must contend. They note that while constant two-way communication strengthens the organization’s 
relationship with their audience, it “implies constant vigilance and a level of attention that is unheard of from 
large government organizations” (p. 9). 
Consequently, many within the team expressed concern about their ability to maintain a consistent level of 
communication with their social media audience during an incident, irrespective of the time of day or week. 
While the team usually has the resources to do this during the day, the existing on-call staffing arrangements 
make this task more difficult overnight and at the weekend. As a result, the inability to guarantee a consistent 
level of communication with their social media audience prevents some within the team from wanting to use 
social media for this purpose at all. Therefore, the team often prioritizes mainstream media over social media 
channels in order to communicate with the public during an incident.  
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study has shown that some EMOs continue to use social media primarily as a platform for disseminating 
information, despite the amount of social media intelligence generated during an emergency that an organization 
could use to inform their disaster response. The lack of availability, limited usability, and high cost of 
intelligence-gathering tools continue to be a problem for these organizations. The development of more user-
friendly and more powerful tools in consultation with these organizations will continue to be an important task 
for researchers, public and private sectors.  
This paper has raised a number of issues that emerge when EMOs use social media, however, there are possible 
solutions. Firstly, changing the approval procedures would make it easier to give progress updates from 
emergencies. These updates would need to include appropriate disclaimers that explain the update is 
unconfirmed, putting the responsibility back on the information receiver to treat the information cautiously. As 
the public expects EMOs to change the way they communicate, organizational policies need to adapt to support 
this expectation. 
Secondly, EMOs should explore ways to remove or hide outdated posts from their social media accounts during 
an emergency, to avoid information from going stale. They could achieve this by working with platforms like 
Facebook or Twitter to create a tool that automatically removes posts after a set period. This would stop the 
spread of outdated information, as posts that followers have shared on Facebook or retweeted on Twitter would 
also disappear. It would be important for multiple EMOs to come together to fund a tool for their circumstances, 
to provide solutions that work across multiple organizations and to share knowledge about what is useful for 
their industry. This solution could create government record-keeping issues; therefore collaborating with social 
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media platforms could be beneficial as they could include a record-keeping feature to the tool to ensure evidence 
of the original post remains. 
Thirdly, EMOs must challenge the deep-set beliefs held by emergency responders that their on-scene activities 
are always more important than providing communicable information that could ensure that others leave and 
stay out of the danger zone. This solution is more complicated and requires widespread cultural change within 
these organizations. However, by challenging and adjusting these beliefs EMOs can potentially save more lives 
in the long-term as affected members of the public can make better-informed decisions for their own safety, 
instead of relying on on-the-ground personnel for assistance. 
Finally, changing the rostering system to 24/7/365 would help these organizations maintain a consistent level of 
communication via social media. This would prevent media officers from working in isolation, particularly 
during incidents where their workload increases. This solution may introduce resourcing challenges, as the 
organization would likely need to hire additional staff to avoid the risk of burnout. It may also be unpopular 
with existing team members who are resistant to shift work. 
This study provides a close analysis of the use of social media in one EMO, the Queensland Fire and Emergency 
Services (QFES). While points of comparison exist between this organization and similar organizations 
elsewhere in Australia, it is important not to generalize the findings of this study. Differences such as 
organizational protocols, geographic variations, and disaster propensity may result in conflicting views about 
social media and its uses. Thus, there is a need for more ethnographic research in other EMOs: for example, 
comparing Queensland with New South Wales or Victoria, the two most populated states in Australia. We know 
that these states routinely manage significant bushfires that often pose more of a threat to lives and property than 
Queensland, while Queensland endures more significant storms and cyclones that these states do not experience. 
These different types of disasters and geographic differences between the states mean that members of the 
public and emergency responders may use social media differently. Nonetheless, we can learn from the 
experiences of QFES and apply these lessons to other organizations where appropriate. Going forward, 
improved knowledge sharing across EMOs is important to ensure that these organizations continually evolve 
and refine their use of social media (Flew et al., 2015). 
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